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The UN Security Council, Normative Legitimacy and the Challenge of 
Specificity 
 
This paper discusses how the general and abstract concept of legitimacy applies to 
international institutions, using the United Nations Security Council as an example. We 
argue that the evaluation of the Security Council’s legitimacy requires considering three 
significant and interrelated aspects: its purpose, competences, and procedural standards. We 
consider two possible interpretations of the Security Council’s purpose: on the one hand, 
maintaining peace and security, and, on the other, ensuring broader respect for human 
rights. Both of these purposes are minimally morally acceptable for legitimacy. Second, we 
distinguish between three different competences of the UNSC: 1) the decision-making 
competence, 2) the quasi-legislative competence, and 3) the referral competence. On this 
basis, we argue that different procedural standards are required to legitimise these 
competences, which leads to a more differentiated understanding of the Security Council’s 
legitimacy. While maintaining that the membership structure of the Council is a severe 
problem for its legitimacy, we suggest other procedural standards that can help to improve 
its overall legitimacy, which include broad transparency, deliberation, and the revisability 
of the very terms of accountability themselves.  
Keywords: legitimacy standards, meta-coordination view, autonomy, competences, 
institutional purpose, feasibility 
Introduction 
The United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) legitimacy has been severely criticised for a 
variety of reasons. The most prominent critiques are centred round the anachronistic composition 
of its membership structure and its inefficiency in sustaining international peace and security in 
the face of long-lasting and deadly conflicts, such as most recently in Syria. But what does it 
mean to question the legitimacy of an international institution, and when are these legitimacy 
critiques justified? Legitimacy can be understood as an empirical or a normative concept. There 
have been different studies examining the sociological legitimacy of the UNSC, as a legitimacy 
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belief or as authority influencing states’ behaviour (e.g. Hurd 1999, Voeten 2005, Cronin and 
Hurd 2008, Binder and Heupel 2015). The literature on the normative legitimacy of international 
institutions is booming. Since Dahl’s (1999) critical contribution, political theorists have 
developed and refined the standards that confer legitimacy on international institutions (e.g. 
Grant and Keohane 2005, Buchanan and Keohane 2006, Buchanan 2013, Macdonald 2016). In 
this literature, the concept of legitimacy is often understood as the ‘right to rule’ (cf. Raz 1986). 
Recent contributions have sought to render the traditionally state-centred understanding of this 
concept applicable to international institutions (e.g. Buchanan and Keohane 2006, Tasioulas 2010, 
Besson 2014). However, most accounts of legitimacy remain highly abstract, which makes their 
application to a specific international institution difficult.  
This paper seeks to further clarify the concept of international legitimacy and show how it 
can be applied to the UNSC specifically. To this end, we draw on the ‘meta-coordination view’ 
of legitimacy (Buchanan 2013, pp. 174–195, 2018). The paper hence offers an illustration of this 
account of international legitimacy and contributes to a more applied understanding of legitimacy 
theory. In the first part, we outline our account of the legitimacy of international institutions. We 
argue that international institutions have to fulfil different standards depending on their purpose 
and competences in order to provide sufficient, content-independent reasons to comply and not to 
interfere in order to be legitimate. Therefore, we examine three significant and interrelated 
aspects of the UNSC: first, the purpose of the UNSC; second, its institutional competences; and 
third, its procedural standards. 
In the second part, we reconstruct two diverging but minimally acceptable readings of the 
purpose of the UNSC in the relevant literature in international relations and international law, 
namely international peace and security on the one hand, and the protection of human rights on 
the other. For this analysis, we concentrate on the question of whether the purpose of the UNSC 
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fulfils minimal moral standards and leave aside the questions of its effectiveness and comparative 
merits vis-à-vis other feasible institutions. In the third part of the paper, we distinguish three 
different competences of the UNSC: 1) decision-making competence; 2) quasi-legislative 
competence; and 3) referral competence. Finally, in the fourth part, we argue for reforms of the 
procedural legitimacy standards of the UNSC on the basis of its purpose and competences. We 
start by discussing membership amendments on the basis of delegation and participation models 
of accountability. For reasons of feasibility, we shift the focus to other procedural standards for 
the outlined competences and argue that the procedural standards for the newer ones are 
particularly lacking.  
The Concept and Standards of Legitimacy for International Institutions  
The concept of legitimacy as the ‘right to rule’ is considered to provide sufficient, content-
independent reason for compliance.1 The meta-coordination view is based on the understanding 
that coercion is not sufficient to make institutions efficient, but that voluntary compliance is 
required, at least to some degree. Buchanan argues that before coordination through an institution 
is possible, it is necessary to converge on how to decide which of the different possible 
institutional alternatives we should coordinate our behaviour around (Buchanan 2013, pp. 174–
195, 2018). The meta-coordination view understands legitimacy as addressing this problem by 
providing standards that are reason-based, falling into the space between self-interest and justice. 
Legitimacy forms part of non-ideal theory as it provides institutional standards under 
circumstances of profound disagreement about justice but where coordination through institutions 
is necessary to move towards justice (Buchanan and Keohane 2006, p. 412). The meta-
coordination view places most of its weight on assessable procedural standards and is therefore 
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epistemically more accessible than a Razian account (Raz 1986) that relies on objective reasons 
over which disagreement might arise. 
Justifying Political Power with Regard to Equal Autonomy 
On the meta-coordination view, legitimacy provides a risk-benefit analysis that includes moral 
considerations (cf. Buchanan 2013, p. 190). Yet what constitutes the relevant risks and benefits 
remains mostly undefined. In our opinion, institutions that exercise authority through rules that 
demand compliance generate special risks and benefits for the autonomy of their subjects. The 
conception of legitimacy that we propose is a specification of the meta-coordination view based 
on the fundamental notion of equal autonomy, including both individual and collective autonomy 
(e.g. Habermas 1996, Chapter 3, Forst 2012, pp. 125–137). However, other readings – for 
example, those based on non-domination or equal consideration of interests – might also be used. 
We focus on political institutions because they do not just narrow the option set of others, but 
also affect their status as norm-givers. Therefore, the claim to political power, i.e. authority, 
through rules is specifically normatively problematic. However, it is different from brute force 
insofar as it addresses those subjected to the rules and demands their compliance. In this sense, 
authorities enter into a form of discourse in which they strive to justify why their rules should 
count as sufficient, content-independent reasons for action to autonomous subjects. On this basis, 
we define legitimacy as the requirement to provide sufficient, content-independent reasons to 
comply and not to interfere with an institution’s rules, compatible with equal autonomy. 
As a value of political institutions, legitimacy applies to institutions with rule-setting 
authority, including rule application and possibly some form of enforcement. In a system of rules, 
it is not only the enforcing agency that exercises political power, but the combination of the 
legislative, executive, and judiciary that creates the systematic capacity to restrict autonomy. 
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Therefore, legitimacy judgements evaluate the justification of political power through both the 
setting and the application of rules, which refers to taking decisions that are supported by and 
embedded within a system of rules or a treaty. We understand rules as applicable to a class of 
individuals or organisations as general standards of behaviour. The international system is, 
however, highly fragmented, which means that these functions can be more dispersed, though 
they can also exhibit less of a separation of powers than within the state. The Security Council is 
such an institution because it operates within the framework of the UN Charter and issues 
declarations that claim to be binding on all UN Members.  
Our concept of legitimacy also comprises a non-ideal dimension. Non-ideal theory is 
especially relevant at the international level because it takes into account feasibility restrictions. 
Currently, we are faced with an international system structured in different states that are not all 
democratic. Assuming that, for normative and pragmatic reasons, it is not possible to force states 
either to become democracies or to establish a democratic, state-like federation without their 
consent, a fully democratic international system is not achievable in the short- or medium-term. 
Therefore, such an ideal alone cannot guide which institutions we should comply with. As such, 
legitimacy for international institutions needs to include non-ideal standards that consider how to 
move from current conditions towards an ideal. In a multilevel framework, international 
institutions cannot and should not be thought to compensate for a lack of democracy on the 
domestic level. However, taking the conditions of individual and collective autonomy as the basis 
for legitimacy establishes two minimal requirements for international institutions. First, taking 
human rights norms as a baseline for individual autonomy, an institution continuously or even 
systematically violating these norms cannot be legitimate. Second, international institutions 
should neither threaten democracy in already democratic states, nor prevent democratic 
development in non-democratic ones.  
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Graded Standards of Legitimacy  
International institutions vary vastly in their purposes, the range of authority they claim in 
carrying out these purposes, and the effects they generate. Given such variety, which legitimacy 
standards are appropriate for international institutions? We argue that international institutions 
have to fulfil different standards of legitimacy depending on their specific purpose(s) and 
competences in rule-setting and application. Based on these parameters, legitimacy standards 
help international institutions to generate sufficient reasons for compliance with their rules by 
minimising the threat to the autonomy of those subjected to them.  
First, the purpose of an institution is itself part of what makes it legitimate. Certain 
institutional purposes are not compatible with securing the conditions of equal autonomy 
regardless of their effects. For example, the purpose of a murder guild violates autonomy even if 
the guild does not actually kill anyone. Therefore, minimal moral acceptability should be 
regarded as a necessary requirement for legitimacy (cf. Buchanan and Keohane 2006, Adams this 
issue). 2  Beyond this restriction, different purposes can be more or less important for the 
protection of autonomy and accordingly generate more or less weighty reasons for compliance. 
Furthermore, institutions should be judged on the basis of how effective they are in achieving 
their purpose. On the one hand, this is necessary for institutions to generate a benefit compared to 
non-institutional alternatives, in order to mitigate the risk of empowering an institution in the first 
place. This is often captured in terms of effectiveness. On the other hand, whether institutions 
also have to create benefits compared to other feasible institutional alternatives is debatable (e.g. 
Buchanan 2013, p. 178). In our opinion, they need to create at least some additional benefits 
when compared with other clearly feasible institutions so as to be legitimate. Otherwise, 
legitimacy cannot achieve its meta-coordinative function. However, feasibility also restricts what 
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can be demanded from an institution to be legitimate. Finally, an institution’s purpose(s) and 
competences are closely connected since the competences needed for an institution heavily 
depend on its purpose. An institution’s purpose also influences the kind of standards they should 
fulfil because the different functions (e.g. legislative, judicative or executive) aim at different 
benefits and create specific risks, which can be supported or constrained by different procedures.  
Second, the kind and degree of competences influences the legitimacy standards required for 
international institutions. The risk to both individual and collective autonomy created by 
international institutions ultimately depends on the political power of the particular institution in 
question. Hence, graded legitimacy standards should be applied. This means that the more 
political power, i.e. rule-setting and application competences, an international institution wields, 
the more demanding procedural legitimacy standards this institution has to meet. Different 
dimensions of political power determine an institution’s capacity to affect the autonomy of its 
subjects. In particular, these dimensions include the scope of its rules, its domain sensitivity, and 
its rule applicability.3 The legitimacy burden for institutions increases if any of these dimensions 
is extended. The first two dimensions concern the width and depth of the institution’s rule-setting 
and application domain. The accumulation of rules – even concerning relatively technical issues 
– can restrict autonomy. Third, the domain sensitivity or depth considers the issues that can be 
affected by the institution and how important these are for autonomy. The applicability of rules 
can be direct or indirect. Since directly applicable rules do not require the agreement of states for 
their implementation, they remove the protection level of domestic institutions for individuals 
and collective autonomy.  
While Buchanan and Keohane (2006) propose minimal standards for the legitimacy of 
international institutions, our approach seeks to determine specific standards for specific 
institutions depending on their competences. As Bodansky puts it, ‘the basis of legitimacy of the 
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Security Council may similarly vary depending on whether it is making a decision in an 
individual case or acting in a quasi-legislative capacity by promulgating more general rules’ 
(2011, p. 8). The higher the competences, the stronger the procedural standards required to 
protect against the risks of undermining the autonomy of all UN Member States and citizens in 
their capacity for self-determination. The traditional way of thinking about how to make 
competence delegation compatible with autonomy is through accountability standards. 
Transparency should be regarded as a general legitimacy standard since it is a precondition for 
accountability. Furthermore, attaching standards to the creation or pedigree of an institution is 
another way to secure accountability. As far as international institutions are concerned, state 
consent is the main standard used in trying to achieve this. In this paper, however, we will not 
discuss the normative advantages and issues related to this standard. Instead, we will focus on the 
revisability of the terms of accountability, which is particularly pertinent if an institution’s 
competences change.  
Third, the overall legitimacy of an institution results from a sufficient balance of reasons 
between the risks and benefits for autonomy. On the one hand, the risk is created by the 
institution’s political power, i.e. its competences and the process of its creation. On the other, 
three factors contribute to the positive reasons for compliance: first, the importance of its purpose 
for autonomy; second, its comparative benefits in achieving said purpose; third, the justification 
of its competences through procedural legitimacy standards.  
In other words, an institution with a very important purpose but only weak procedural 
standards might still provide sufficient reasons to be legitimate. For example, Christiano argues 
that institutions that fulfil morally mandatory aims do not require state consent (2012 and in this 
issue). Vice versa, procedural standards may provide reasons to comply with institutions that do 
not function wholly efficiently. The overall sufficiency of reasons to comply constitutes 
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legitimacy as a threshold. However, the feasibility of institutional alternatives relevant for both 
efficiency and procedural standards can shift this threshold considerably (to the point where the 
non-institutional option would prevail). Since epistemic uncertainties, particularly regarding 
feasibility, need to be taken into account, it is still important to consider which procedural 
standards help to shift the balance in favour of legitimacy. 
In the next section, we evaluate the purpose of the UNSC by discussing its importance for 
autonomy and minimal moral acceptability. Discussing its effectiveness and comparative benefits 
would require an in-depth empirical analysis of the UNSC’s performance, which goes beyond the 
scope of the present paper. That said, it is clear that the UNSC faces some notable challenges in 
this respect. One of the largest problems of the UNSC’s effectiveness is not its action, but its 
inaction (cf. Berdal 2003, p. 26, Buchanan and Keohane 2011, pp. 48, 51). The ability to control 
the unauthorised use of force – in particular by the US – remains another central issue (cf. Weiss 
2003, Malone 2004).4 Finally, since the UNSC forms part of a bigger organisation, the checks 
and balances in the UN system, in particular its relationship to the General Assembly (GA), are 
also relevant for its legitimacy but go beyond the scope of this paper. Due to these restrictions, 
we cannot provide an all-things-considered assessment of the UNSC’s legitimacy. Rather, we 
focus on the UNSC’s competences in order to determine procedural standards of legitimacy that 
can contribute to improving the balance of reasons. 
Two Readings of the UNSC’s Purpose: Beyond the Letter of the UN Charter 
How should the purpose of an institution be defined? Formally, the purpose of the UNSC is 
defined by the UN Charter. Since our aim here is not to produce an in-depth analysis of the 
effectiveness of the UNSC, but rather to provide a normative evaluation of its purpose, we start 
with the explicit purpose as stated in Article 24 of the UN Charter, namely the Council’s 
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‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and stability’. This purpose 
sets it apart from the League of Nations’ unspecified mandate. This purpose has to be interpreted 
in light of its evolutive practice. While initially aiming at resolving inter-state conflicts, the 
UNSC has resorted to Chapter VII of the UN Charter to address intra-state conflicts or non-
military issues, whether national, regional or global. The scope of the UNSC’s mandate in this 
domain is ‘broad, if not virtually unfettered or unlimited, other than by the purpose and principles 
of the Charter, themselves broadly defined’ (Shraga 2011, p. 12).   
Discussing how one should understand the UNSC’s purpose of ‘maintaining and restoring 
international peace and stability’ in more detail is therefore necessary to assess its importance and 
the requirement of minimal moral acceptability. We suggest that the UNSC’s evolving practice 
pursues two broad goals: (1) the ‘classical’ maintenance of peace and stability, or (2) the 
protection of human rights. Clearly, the two purposes are not mutually exclusive.  
One reading confines the purpose to the UNSC’s founding but evolutive aim of the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Two classical types of resolutions grounded in 
Chapter VI more concretely illustrate this first reading: peace-keeping and peace-building 
operations. The former, for instance, comprises the military observation of ceasefires following 
inter-state wars, while the latter, for instance, includes the reintegration of former soldiers into 
society or the rebuilding of rule of law institutions (legislative, judiciary, executive). Clearly, 
securing the interest(s) of states in security, peace, sovereignty, and self-determination remains 
the core normative value behind this reading. Interestingly, David Bosco suggests dividing this 
initial broad reading into two more specific sub-readings: the concert one, and the governance 
model. The governance model suggests that, moving from the original and formal mandate of 
preventing and managing inter-state conflict, the UNSC’s purpose is to effectively address the 
external and novel threats to international peace and security, such as epidemic diseases or 
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climate change. The ‘securitisation’ of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the UNSC’s agenda – such as 
the most recent 2011 resolution on the role of peace-keepers as vectors of HIV (Res. 1983 (2011)) 
– would be an illustrative example. Bosco does not, however, circumscribe the domain of 
‘governance’ itself in clear terms (2014, p. 546). In contrast, the concert variant exclusively 
focuses on facilitating diplomatic negotiation between the five permanent members of the UNSC 
(United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) and therefore restricts the interest(s) 
at stake to this restricted circle: ‘a concert perspective shifts the focus from the body’s ability to 
resolve external challenges to its impact on relations between permanent members’ (Bosco 2014, 
p.  546). This concert view is reinforced by a consensualist decision-making process rather than a 
majority or super-majority: ‘among the permanent members, the veto ensures that the Council is 
consensus-based’ (Bosco 2014, pp. 548–549).  
At the other end of the spectrum, a far more challenging reading of the UNSC’s purpose 
extends the purpose to the protection of human rights – a view that has been more developed by 
legal scholars. We suggest viewing this aim as individuals-oriented as it is individuals, but not 
necessarily states, that benefit from this much wider purpose. Although the UNSC is not a party 
to the main human rights treaties (such as the ICCPR), the un-avoided atrocities of the post-Cold 
War era (former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, East Timor, and Sierra Leone), the subsequent 
formalisation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (Res. 1674 (2006)) and the expansion of 
UN-mandated bodies (ECOSOC, Human Rights Council, UN treaty bodies) have carved out a 
novel role for the UNSC to address intra-state or internal conflicts and use the language of human 
rights to articulate policies. Scholars of the UNSC speak of a ‘normative shift’ (Hassler 2014, p. 
28) or ‘paradigm shift’ (Rodley 2016, p. 776) despite the fierce debate on the legality of 
humanitarian intervention. Legally, one can argue that human rights – through their growing 
recognition and implementation by Member States – have become general principles of 
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international law (in the meaning of Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute) applicable to international 
organisations that exercise ‘governmental authority’ (Sarooshi 1999, p. 16). Endorsing the states’ 
implementation efforts would then fuel the very definition of international peace and security. As 
Shraga puts it, ‘a conceptual link was thus established between human rights and international 
peace and security, or between their serious, systematic and massive violations and the existence 
of a threat to the peace’ (2011, p. 12). 
It soon becomes apparent that these two readings fulfil the requirement of minimal moral 
acceptability set out above. Both aim at securing a basic form of personal and collective 
autonomy through the protection from state-sponsored atrocities against individuals (personal 
autonomy) and/or by ensuring the state’s capacity to exercise external sovereignty through non-
interference (collective autonomy). In fact, these purposes are more than merely acceptable; they 
are of fundamental importance in creating and preserving the conditions for autonomy. However, 
one may interpret the purpose of an institution too charitably if one only takes into account 
official statements and regulations. Those in power might use institutions to further their interests 
while framing the purpose of the institution as a public good. It is important to keep this issue in 
mind while discussing how the institution’s purpose is actually implemented. A further caveat is 
in order here: the minimal condition for equal autonomy in fulfilling its purpose means that an 
institution should at least not create new, or sustain severe extant, inequalities. Whether the 
UNSC fulfils this condition remains highly questionable.5 
The Changing Competences of the UNSC 
The political power of an institution understood as rule-setting and applying competences have to 
be justified to those subjected to its rules in order to be legitimate. Since higher competences 
pose a higher risk to autonomy, stronger procedural safeguards are required. We understand 
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‘competences’ as the legal mandate that is conferred on the institution by means of treaty law and 
its interpretation in practice. This concept captures the principled authority that the institution 
claims and the de facto use of authority that may overstep these claims. It appears that the terms 
of the treaty have been filled by the situations to which it has been applied, which are 
documented in the resolutions that the UNSC is empowered to generate.  
On this basis, we distinguish three different competences of the UNSC. First, the UNSC 
has the narrow and exclusive competence to determine the creation, deployment, and use of 
military force in international relations in a system structured by the default principle of non-
intervention in domestic affairs (UN Charter Article 2(4)). The procedural conditions for 
resorting to military force are enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It must be borne in 
mind, however, that Chapter VI offers various non-military measures that should be primarily 
exhausted (peace settlement measures). The collective security system serves an interest that all 
Member States share, namely the protection of their autonomy vis-à-vis external interferences – 
an interest that the UN Charter refers to as ‘the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state’ (Article 2(4)). Now, Member States can resort to military force without the UNSC’s 
authorisation, but only within the scope fixed by the same charter, namely self-defence (Article 
51). Once the UNSC is seized, however, the right to self-defence is suspended. The political 
power that the Security Council exercises by adopting resolutions with a primarily executive 
character is what we call the decision-making competence of the UNSC. The Charter also 
establishes corresponding responsibilities on the part of its subjects (all UN Member States) in 
Article 25: ‘the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
UNSC in accordance with the present Charter’. This means that the decisions and resolutions of 
the UNSC enjoy the status of binding obligations upon all UN Member States as a matter of 
international law. Within this competence, the UNSC can resort to a variety of softer tools to 
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undertake its mandate. Chapter VI of the Charter encourages and recommends peaceful 
settlements of disputes (Articles 33–38), while Chapter VII of the Charter allows for a range of 
sanctions: forcible sanctions (Article 40) or economic and other non-forcible sanctions (Article 
41). In accordance with Article 28 of the Charter, the UNSC can create a variety of subsidiary 
bodies as needed for the performance of its functions. These include committees, working groups, 
investigative bodies, international tribunals, peacekeeping operations, political missions, and the 
Peacebuilding Commission as an advisory, subsidiary organ.  
Second, its competences apply to a broad and indeterminate domain, namely all threats to 
international peace and security – a domain that the UNSC has the exclusive (and legally 
recognised) latitude to define. As Bosco puts it, ‘the Charter makes no geographic or qualitative 
distinction between potential disruptions to the peace and makes clear that the Council can 
investigate any dispute it deems dangerous to peace and security’ (2011, p. 546). This 
indeterminacy leads to what we refer to as the quasi-legislative competence conferred to the 
UNSC by the UN Charter itself. This means that the UNSC can create law through resolutions 
that include general and abstract norms incurring binding obligations on states (cf. Tsagourias 
2011). There is ongoing debate about how far this quasi-legislative competence goes and whether 
it reaches beyond the issues of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (e.g. Res. 1373 (2001) 
and 1540 (2004); (cf. Neusüss 2008, Hassler 2012, p. 16). However, these two cases show that 
the UNSC has the capacity to act through competences that are broad and that resemble those of a 
legislative body.   
Third, according to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute in conjunction with Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the UNSC can refer situations to the International Criminal Court (ICC). This third 
capacity is what we call the referral competence of the UNSC. In general, ICC investigations can 
only take place in UN Member States that are state parties to the Rome Treaty (2002). However, 
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the referral enables prosecutions in situations outside the Court’s treaty-based territorial and 
national jurisdiction. While we cannot address this referral competence and practice in detail here, 
suffice it to say that it signals the growing role of the UNSC in addressing basic interests of 
individuals at the expense of state authority. Indeed, international crimes concern the large-scale 
and systematic crimes committed by states or de facto public authorities against individuals 
(Zysset 2016).  
In conclusion, the UNSC has developed its rule-setting and applying competences far beyond 
a narrow understanding of collective security limited to non-interference and international peace. 
Even though its resolutions have no direct effect in the legal sense – meaning that its decisions 
are not immediately valid in the domestic legal order – and although the UNSC’s decisions leave 
a wide degree of discretion to states to determine the appropriate course of action, its potential 
capacity to restrict state autonomy is severe. The UNSC issues resolutions that are directly 
binding on UN members, and even though its competences may not concern a very wide set of 
issues, the issues in question lie at the heart of autonomy considerations. First, security or the 
protection of basic human rights is a fundamental precondition for individual autonomy. Second, 
the UNSC’s competences also have the capacity to severely restrict collective autonomy by 
allowing the use of force or by issuing other sanctions against sovereign states. Therefore, the 
legitimacy of the UNSC requires (besides the effectiveness in pursuing its purpose) fulfilling 
procedural standards so as to minimise the danger that these far-reaching competences pose to 
autonomy. It should be noted that the discussed competences might require procedural standards 
that contradict one another. 
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Procedural Standards of the UNSC’s Legitimacy  
What legitimacy standards are implied by the range of the UNSC’s competences discussed here? 
The Council has often been criticised, and reforms of both its membership structure and its 
procedures have been demanded. The first issue concerns in particular the veto of the permanent 
members.6 Even though all members on the Council formally have one vote according to Article 
27(1), the necessity to include ‘the concurring votes of the permanent members’ (Article 27(3)) 
gives them the power to block decisions. Besides the veto, further questions regarding the 
representativeness of the UNSC, in a world that is fundamentally different from the one of 1945, 
have been raised (e.g. Caron 1993, Fassbender 1998, Hassler 2012). In this section, we first 
analyse the issue of the Council’s membership structure. In a second step, we discuss how 
procedural standards regarding the decision-making process that go beyond the questions of 
membership may justify the three competences of the UNSC outlined above. 
UNSC Membership Structure: Delegation or Participation? 
Due to the restricted size and structure of permanent and elected members, the UNSC does not 
represent all UN Member States equally. Yet what kind of representation is required of this 
particular institution? We suggest that representation is important as it creates accountability as a 
mechanism through which to limit political power. Grant and Keohane define accountability as a 
process in which ‘some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge 
whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose 
sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met’ (2005, p. 26). 
Accountability, therefore, always includes elements of ex post control. Grant and Keohane further 
suggest distinguishing between participation and delegation models of accountability. Both 
models allow for various degrees of discretion versus ex ante instructions. However, they differ 
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on the question of who is entitled to hold the powerful accountable: in the participation model, 
those affected are entitled, while in the delegation model, those entrusting them with powers are 
entitled. Representation can be understood in both ways as participation- or delegation-centred 
accountability. International institutions are often based on the delegation model. Therefore, what 
is at stake here is not a lack of accountability, but rather to whom those institutions are 
accountable – in the case of the delegation model, powerful states (cf. Grant and Keohane 2005). 
From a normative perspective, the protection of autonomy through accountability standards is 
only possible if all subjected to the rules of an institution can hold it accountable.7 Therefore, the 
participation model is the relevant legitimacy standard in order to guarantee meaningful 
accountability. 
On the delegation model, the inequalities in the Security Council’s membership structure are 
not incompatible with accountability. The Member States have delegated political power by 
consenting to an international treaty and to the corresponding procedures to check the authority 
holders. While this corresponds to the general standard of state consent in international relations, 
several normative problems connected with this understanding of accountability follow. First, the 
question of origin or source legitimacy arises – in particular for non-democratic states, but also 
for the international system providing sufficiently just background conditions (cf. Ronzoni 2009) 
under which consent can be understood to be normatively binding (e.g. Christiano 2010, 
Buchanan 2013). Second, even though state consent can, to some degree, function as a protection 
for collective autonomy, it remains questionable whether these inequalities are compatible with 
autonomy. Third, in the case of the UN membership, the one-time consent will bind all future 
generations to follow, even if the competences of the Security Council change.  
Regarding the representativeness of the UNSC, the participation model – based on holding 
institutions accountable to those subjected to its rules – requires modifying the membership 
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structure of the UNSC. Reform proposals concern mainly the enlargement of formal membership 
(permanent or non-permanent) and the improvement of representativeness (e.g. by more accurate 
regional distribution). As Hurd (2008) points out, these suggestions involve a trade-off between 
increasing the legitimacy of the UNSC for some, while reducing it for others. While this may be 
the case for the sociological legitimacy that individual Member States exhibit either as a belief in 
the UNSC’s legitimacy or in terms of compliance, it is not true for the normative legitimacy of 
the Council. For example, an improved regional representation can increase the Council’s 
legitimacy for all, not just those who ‘benefit’ from the representation. The UNSC’s current 
structure is particularly problematic from the perspective of accountability to those subjected, 
since the Council’s agenda mainly concerns developed countries while four of the five permanent 
members ‘are from the Westernized, northern hemisphere, and even China’s non-industrial status 
is rapidly changing’ (Hassler 2012, p. 93).  
In conclusion, the participation model is normatively more robust than the delegation model 
because it is based on the all-subjected principle that seeks to promote the autonomy of all 
equally and not just one of the delegating states. It follows that the membership structure should 
be changed. Yet the argument of contributions has been used to justify the current structure of the 
UNSC. Historically, the veto was essential for bringing on board the states that could provide the 
necessary military power to realise the Council’s purpose (Hassler 2012, p. 35). Even if the 
international power structure has drastically changed since its foundation, the inclusion of the 
major powers is probably still the only way to bind them if compliance with the prohibition of 
use of force is the ultimate goal. This is a question of effectiveness and other feasible institutional 
alternatives. Since the participation of the powerful states is seen as necessary to maintain 
collective security, the UNSC’s membership structure reproduces rather than overcomes the 
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power inequalities of the states in the international system. This means that in the current setting, 
states’ self-interest makes the UNSC a highly power-based forum.  
The feasibility of changing the membership structure constitutes, therefore, a serious 
legitimacy challenge (e.g. Weiss 2003). Keohane and Buchanan suggest the revisability of the 
terms of accountability as a legitimacy standard in itself. Based on the premise that there is 
reasonable disagreement about what accountability precisely entails, legitimacy cannot but 
depend on whether an institution facilitates ‘principled, factually informed deliberation about the 
terms of accountability’ (Buchanan and Keohane 2006, p. 427). What does it mean that the terms 
of accountability must be revisable in light of critical reflection and discussion? For Buchanan 
and Keohane, this standard depends on feedback from external agents such as NGOs. In their 
own evaluation of the UNSC’s legitimacy, Buchanan and Keohane (2011) evaluate the 
revisability of the UNSC’s terms rather positively because its goals have been adapted. While we 
agree with this evaluation of the purpose, in our opinion this does not fully capture the 
revisability of the terms of accountability. Evaluating revisability should also concern the 
question of whether procedural standards are adaptable – particularly if the institutional 
competences change. In this respect, external actors’ feedback is important and can be a good 
indicator of the need for change, although there will hardly be a unified view as to what about the 
terms needs to be adapted, and when. Therefore, we suggest that revising the terms of 
accountability should be considered one of the main standards for an international institution’s 
legitimacy when its competences have changed. This form of revisability could also alleviate 
some of the problems of the delegation model (such as restricting the autonomy of future 
generations).  
Now, how can the UNSC’s terms of accountability be revised? Article 108 (or in theory 109) 
of the Charter determines the procedure through which the UN Charter can be amended. In short, 
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amendments have to be adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly 
and ratified by two thirds, including the permanent members. This means that the terms of 
accountability can be adapted; however, the requirements are highly demanding. Since the 
enlargement from six to ten elected members in 1965, no reform proposals have been successful. 
In 1993, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to set up an Open-ended Working Group 
on Council reform.8 However, it is questionable whether the UN, under the current rules for 
change and with the increased number of members, is still able to change the Council’s 
membership structure (cf. Hosli and Dörfler 2017). Therefore, the possibility to revise the terms 
of accountability poses one of the most pressing problems for the procedural legitimacy of the 
UNSC. 
Assuming that the feasibility of changing the membership structure is not a given in the 
short- to medium-term, this changes the question to that of whether circumventing the UNSC 
could generate an alternative institution or whether its structural deficit drops the balance of 
reasons to the level of the non-institutional alternative. For these questions, the importance of the 
institution’s purpose and its effectiveness in achieving this end are essential. Polarisation in the 
Security Council may increase to the point where non-institutional alternatives may be preferable. 
Yet, if stability considerations and the preservation of current international law matter, the 
transition costs resulting from abandoning the UNSC are significant. However, feasibility is not a 
static restraint; rather, it depends on the involved actors, timeframe, and practice (cf. Gilabert and 
Lawford-Smith 2012, Erman and Kuyper this issue). Certain actions in the present may open up 
different options in the future. A particular problem in this regard arises if the institution itself 
contributes to keeping alternative institutions unfeasible. However, given that the purpose of the 
UNSC is of high importance, and assuming that a similarly efficient, alternative institution with a 
more appropriate membership structure is currently not feasible, the unequal membership 
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structure of the Council is as such not a completely delegitimising feature. However, this does 
not mean that we should not try to change this structure or even seek to establish better 
alternatives. A more detailed discussion of feasibility and how the interplay of different actors in 
a multilevel system, such as states or citizens, is required to make these assessments for 
international institutions. This is of particular relevance, as the lack of political will on the part of 
certain powerful actors should not be taken to create binding obligations for others. 
Alternatives to Membership Reforms: Justifying the Three Competences of the UNSC 
The different competences of the UNSC, the expanded reach of the UN membership, and the 
outlined deficits of the UNSC’s membership structure point to the need for additional procedural 
standards to improve the balance of reasons of the UNSC’s overall legitimacy. Two widely 
discussed procedural standards regarding the internal working methods of the Council are 
transparency and deliberation. 
Transparency is crucial to achieve any form of accountability. Reliable information on how 
the institution is actually performing must be provided. However, under the conditions of 
incongruence between the subjected and the accountability holders, ‘broad transparency’ 
(Buchanan and Keohane 2006, p. 426), making information accessible to agents external to the 
institution, is required. In terms of the UNSC’s transparency, several aspects stand out. First, the 
UNSC’s institutional link to the UN General Assembly should be considered: Article 24(3) states 
that ‘the Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General 
Assembly for its consideration’. Second, the Council President regularly briefs non-members and 
the press about private meetings (Weiss 2003, p. 154). Third, the accessibility for NGOs has been 
improved through informal exchanges, e.g. with the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) or the NGO Working Group on the UNSC. Additionally, the so-called Security Council 
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Report, a private but publicly funded independent organisation, aims explicitly at advancing the 
transparency of the UNSC. 9  While these structures do not fulfil the perfect ideal of broad 
transparency and need to be strengthened further, they are in our opinion sufficient to create the 
basis for legitimacy.  
Discourse standards can increase the legitimacy of international institutions by enhancing 
both the quality and inclusiveness of the discussion (e.g. Steffek 2003, Johnstone 2008). From the 
start, the idea of the UNSC was to establish procedures that induce major military powers to 
consider one another’s interests (Hassler 2012, p. 31). In fact, the UNSC can also grant non-
members access through Article 31: ‘any Member of the United Nations which is not a member 
of the UNSC may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the 
UNSC whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected’.10 
Furthermore, the number and scope of subsidiary bodies assisting the UNSC’s functions have 
been continuously growing, and these serve to increase the Council’s knowledge and 
transparency. In addition to country-specific bodies, the themes of terrorism and international 
tribunals, for instance, have several dedicated bodies.11 Since the majority of bodies are chaired 
by non-permanent members and operate by consensus, they provide significant opportunities for 
UN Member States to get informed and have their say in discussions relevant to the UNSC’s 
work. Furthermore, the UNSC sends missions of representatives to countries in crisis to hear the 
views of those affected (Weiss 2003, p. 154).  
We hold that the decision-making competence can be regarded as partly legitimised through 
standards of transparency, but the latter should be strengthened through discursive improvements, 
in particular via restrictions on the use of the veto. The draft resolution presented by the Small 
Five discusses possible restrictions on the veto and mentions: i) explaining the reason for using 
the veto; and ii) abstaining from the use of the veto in the ‘event of genocide, crimes against 
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humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law’.12 The requirement to make 
reasons public improves the discourse without preventing the abuse of the veto in the strict sense; 
it pressures the permanent members to use their power responsibly and in accordance with 
reasons that are acceptable to all UN members. Therefore, such discourse-theoretical 
improvements with regard to the use of the veto specifically are highly conducive to the UNSC’s 
legitimacy and should be implemented in order to counter the inequalities embodied in the veto. 
Two other issues that deserve further attention, since they are areas of possible improvement, are 
the penholder system and the short term length of the elected members (Martin 2018). However, 
the revisability of the terms of accountability remains problematic, even more so for the other 
two (newer) competences.  
The quasi-legislative competence enables the Council to restrict the autonomy of its subjects 
even further, as it creates the capacity to interfere with their self-legislation. Therefore, more 
equal participation would be required to counterbalance the risks created by this competence. The 
existing deliberative standards are insufficient to effectively protect autonomy with regard to the 
quasi-legislative competence as they only provide access to the discussion in the Council to non-
members when the UNSC itself grants it. Since neither the abolition of the veto nor the increase 
in membership seem realisable in the short- or medium-term, these competences should rather be 
exercised by the UN General Assembly.  
Finally, the referral competence of the Council opens up questions of impartiality and 
independence as this competence may affect not only the legitimacy of the UNSC, but also that 
of the ICC by changing its jurisdictional reach. Since the purpose of a court requires impartiality 
and independence, the political nature of these referrals and the bias in case selection of the 
ICC,13 to which the former contributes, leads to the de-legitimation of the ICC. In our view, this 
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also creates a legitimacy problem for the UNSC. Hence, the procedural standards required for 
this competence and the political nature of the Council are simply not compatible. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to show how the concept of legitimacy can be applied to specific 
international institutions following the example of the UNSC. By specifying the meta-
coordination view of legitimacy based on the protection of the autonomy of those subject to the 
political power of an institution exercised through its rule-setting and applying competences, we 
have identified key aspects that are relevant for applying legitimacy to international institutions. 
In order to assess the risks and benefits that an institution creates for autonomy, i.e. the balance of 
content-independent reasons to comply, one needs to fully consider the purpose and the 
competences of an institution, as well as its efficiency, the feasibility of institutional alternatives, 
and procedural standards. 
Applying the concept of legitimacy to the UNSC, therefore, requires determining its purpose 
and competence. We have shown that the UNSC’s original mandate of maintaining peace and 
stability, with a focus on non-interference through the collective security system, has extended to 
the protection of human rights. Both purposes are not only minimally morally acceptable but 
crucial to individual and collective autonomy. We have determined three different competences 
of the UNSC – namely the decision-making competence, the quasi-legislative competence, and 
the referral competence. We have argued that the legitimacy assessment of the UNSC can be 
differentiated along these competences insofar as they require different procedural standards. On 
this basis, we have recommended that either extended competences should be reduced or the 
procedural standards should be improved. In particular, the competences of quasi-legislation and 
referral are rather problematic precisely because at present they are not sufficiently supported by 
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procedural standards. Therefore, the broader purpose of the UNSC should be welcomed from the 
perspective of legitimacy, whereas its wider competences should be seen more critically. 
Notes 
                                                 
1 We do not take a position on the conceptual question as to whether legitimacy should be 
understood as an exclusive ‘right to rule’ connected to a duty to obey. In particular, we do not 
discuss whether these reasons need to be pre-emptive, in the Razian sense, or ‘weighty’ in some 
other way (e.g. Raz 1986, p. 46, Buchanan 2010, pp. 83–84). As such, we refer to sufficient, 
content-independent reasons for compliance, which we consider to be compatible with both 
understandings. 
2 What we consider here as not minimally morally acceptable is what falls beyond the scope 
of the right to do wrong in Adams’ understanding (this issue). 
3  For a more detailed account of how institutional competences influence the required 
legitimacy standards see Scherz (2018). 
4 Voeten (2005) argues for a restricted version of this argument, namely that the legitimacy 
of the UNSC is given if it makes the unauthorised use of power costly, not impossible. 
5 Buchanan and Keohane define minimal moral acceptability as the requirement to ‘not 
persist in committing serious injustices’ (2006, p. 419). Our definition highlights how these 
injustices can only be understood if equality is considered. 
6  The Council consists of fifteen Member States: the five permanent members are the 
Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (now the Russian Federation), 
the United Kingdom, and the United States of America (Article 23(1)); and ten seats are assigned 
by election for a set period of two years, as regulated in Article 23(2). 
7 We apply the all-subjected not the all-affected principle in this paper (for a discussion of 
the difference between these principles, see Näsström (2011) and Scherz (2013). 
8 A/RES/48/26 http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r026.htm  
9 Their report is accessible at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org 
10 Article 32 provides similar access for non-UN members. 
11 Cf. https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ 
 
 26 
                                                                                                                                                              
12 The S5 consisted of Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland. Their 
initiative lasted form March 2006 until May 2012, and later created the May 2013 launch of the 
follow-up project ACT for Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency by 22 governments. 
Draft resolution A/66/L.42/Rev.2, entitled ‘Enhancing the accountability, transparency and 
effectiveness of the Security Council’. 
13 See also Christiano’s contribution in this issue on the legitimacy of the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
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